Abstract

How cogent is Louis Althusser's self-criticism started in mid-60s to rectify his earlier theoreticism is much debated in contemporary critical scene. My position in this debate is to prove that Althusser in his self-criticism indeed lays bare a lot of blind spots which his earlier theoreticism is riddled with and then opens up the alliance of theoretical practice with other practices which his earlier theoreticism renders impossible.

This paper is broken down into three part. In the first part, I start with Althusser's inconsistent treatment of "guilt feelings" in Reading Capital and his oft-discussed ISA essay. While Althusser comes up with the theory of "guilty reading" in Reading Capital to grant the subject of theoretical practice every latitude in producing scientific knowledge and thus detaching himself from ideology, he disavows rightly after bringing up the existence of "guilty feelings" on the part of the subject of other practices in ISA essay and consequently traps the subject in ideological control without providing any exit. Besides enlarging on why "guilt feelings" of the subject guarantees his detachment from ideology, I will argue that his inconsistent treatment is indicative of a constant error that Althusser's theoreticism is subject to—that is, the primacy of theoretical practice over other practices. In the second part, I will argue that insofar as this primacy does not pay due attention to the relative autonomy of all social practices that Althusser himself elaborates in his historical materialism, it forces Althusser's epistemology into a blind alley and makes it theoretically tenuous and politically lame. The entirely autonomous character of scientific-theoretical practice leads to an epistemology which not only renders impossible the ongoing development of knowledge but, while applied in the domain of politics, also elevate the knowledge it produces to the transcendental truth to govern the progress of other practices in the manner of pedagogue. The major contributing factor to these problems is Althusser's ignorance of the radical otherness or exteriority inherent in the object of knowledge and in the non-theoretical practices under investigation. This radical exteriority makes the object of knowledge resistant to the formulation of theory which works on it and thus activates the ongoing transformation of theory. In the final part, I will argue that the discovery of this exteriority is the chief contribution that Althusser's self-criticism makes. By redefining philosophy and creating a bland-new epistemology, Althusser brings back the relatively autonomous character that theoretical practice and other practices hold in common. Once the primacy of theoretical practices over other practices is denied, the exteriority of the other practices under theoretical investigation is underlined and the interaction between theoretical practice and other practices precipitated so that the incessant transformation of theory is warranted and the political dogmatism that Althusser's earlier theoreticism is indicative of also trashed.

Keywords: dialectical materialism, historical materialism, science, philosophy, relative autonomy, theoretical practice and other practices, guilt feelings, guilty readings, GI-GII-GIII, remainder, practical ideologies, theoretical ideologies, represent, exterior, otherness, errant matter, interior